Add-on treatments are the new black. They are provided (most frequently, sold) to people undergoing 29 in vitro fertilization on the premise that they will improve the chances of having a baby. However, the 30 regulation of add-ons is consistently minimal, meaning that they are introduced into routine practice 31 before they have been shown to improve the live birth rate. Debate over the adequacy of this light-touch 32 approach rages. Defenders argue that demands for a rigorous approval process are paternalistic, since 33 this would delay access to promising treatments. Critics respond that promising treatments may turn 34 out to have adverse effects on patients and their offspring, contradicting the clinician's responsibility to 35 do no harm. Some add-ons, including earlier versions of PGT-A, might even reduce the live birth rate, 36 raising the prospect of desperate patients paying more to worsen their chances. Informed consent 37 represents a solution in principle, but in practice there is a clear tension between impartial information 38 and direct-to-consumer advertising. Because the effects of a treatment can't be known until it has been 39 robustly evaluated, we argue that strong evidence should be required before add-ons are introduced to 40 the clinic. In the meantime, there is an imperative to identify methods for communicating the associated 41 risks and uncertainties of add-ons to prospective patients. 42 43 Capsule 44 How should IVF add-ons be regulated? Is it ethical to provide unproven treatments? How can we inform 45 patients about the risks and uncertainties? 46
Introduction 54
The decision to seek treatment for infertility usually follows from a failure to conceive naturally, often 55 after years of trying. The investment of the couple is physical, emotional, and in non-public health 56 systems, financial. Nobody has IVF on a whim. 57
58
The likelihood that treatment will result in a live birth varies considerably depending on the patient's 59 prognostic profile, and in some populations first line treatments such as intra-uterine insemination (for 60 unexplained or mild-male infertility) or ovulation induction (for anovulatory infertility) have a high 61 success rate (1, 2) . Despite this, IVF is often employed as the default first line treatment for patients 62 presenting with various kinds of subfertility, causing some commentators to suggest that it is overused 63
(3). Unfortunately, IVF frequently doesn't result in a baby; the US national report of the Society for 64
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART) puts the cumulative live birth rate per attempted egg 65 retrieval at 37% (4). Although multiple IVF attempts may increase the cumulative chance of live birth, 66 many patients do not have babies as a result of their treatment. Each time treatment fails, patients are 67 faced with a choice: give up or try again. Patients may feel that they have to make this decision under 68 time pressure, and that delays deliberating could very well cause them to lose their opportunity to 69 conceive and have children. These concerns might be exaggerated, since material decline in fertility 70 manifests over a timespan of years rather than months, but may be voiced by some treatment providers. 71
Moreover, patients often have to decide which clinic to attend in order to maximise their chance of 72 success. 73 74 This situation creates competition for patients, and IVF clinics frequently market themselves both by 75 emphasising their superior performance (not always with veracity (5-7) and by offering to make people's 'dreams come true' (8). Attempting to gain a competitive edge, or perhaps simply hoping to 77 maintain parity with rivals, clinics offer optional add-on treatments to people undergoing IVF. These 78 add-ons are non-essential interventions which may be offered to people undergoing IVF with the claim 79 that they will increase the chance of success, such as endometrial scratching, embryo glue, steroids to 80 suppress immunity, or preimplantation genetic testing for aneuploidy (PGT-A). While data on global 81 patterns of add-on usage are limited, a UK survey of clinic-users initiated by the Human Fertilisation 82
and Embryology Authority (HFEA) reported that 74% of respondents had used at least one add-on, that 83 usage was growing, and that usage was greater with privately funded treatment (9). Add-ons should be 84 distinguished from additional procedures that are rendered necessary by some diagnoses (such as 85 intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) or surgical sperm retrieval for some couples with severe male 86 factor infertility). They should also be distinguished from treatments that are integral to IVF. For 87 example, although we can debate which ovarian stimulation protocol is most effective and safe, IVF 88 typically requires some form of ovarian stimulation to be performed, and so we would not consider any 89 particular protocol to constitute an 'add-on'. If add-on interventions were unequivocally effective 90 (improving the cumulative live birth rate per started cycle), their sale would not pose an ethical 91 quandary. However, robust supportive studies of the effectiveness of these procedures are lacking, with 92 no add-on therapy being given the green light in a recent review of the evidence in the United Kingdom 93 (10). Given the considerable uncertainty around whether add-ons work, questions arise regarding the 94 appropriateness of offering them to patients who are often desperate, and believe that clinics rely on 95 validated science for all treatments. Is it ever acceptable to offer, and sell, treatments of unclear 96 The regulation of IVF add-ons is consistently minimal (11). Usually, new fertility interventions are 103 rapidly adopted on the basis of case reports, rather than following formal regulatory review (12). In the United States, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only requires a full benefit/ risk evaluation 105 when human cellular and tissue-based products are manipulated to a "more-than-minimal" degree (13) 106 in (12). So far, no fertility intervention has been considered as meeting this criterion. In the United 107
Kingdom, HFEA has limited power to prevent the sale of add-ons, or to control pricing (14) . When 108 considering a new treatment, HFEA can only refuse it on the grounds of safety; effectiveness is not a 109 consideration. However, the UK regulator has issued a consensus statement in conjunction with industry 110 and patient stakeholder groups outlining several principles of responsible innovation (15). These state 111 that add-ons may be offered even when there is little or conflicting evidence provided that information 112 about the current state of knowledge is given to patients. Where there is no evidence of efficacy and 113 safety, the statement advises that treatments should only be offered as part of research. Both the HFEA 114 and the Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority (VARTA) in Australia provide 115 information to consumers to make them aware that add-ons may not improve their chance of success 116 (10, 16). However, there is no such regulatory body in the U.S, nor in most other countries. 117 118 119 Self-regulation, in conjunction with market forces, appears to represent the standard for regulation of 120 IVF innovations in many parts of the world. This is not just true for Western nations (17) (18). 121
Consequently, in markets such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Slovenia where very little IVF is 122 privately funded and most is delivered in state hospitals (19) While the status quo amounts to a self-regulated free-for-all driven largely by commercial pressures, it 131 is unclear whether or not this will persist. Both executive and popular interest in add-ons has increased, 132 partially as a result of high-profile media coverage of the topic in the UK (20), and this may lead to 133 some form of regulatory response from policy makers. 134 135 136 However, support for changes to the regulatory framework surrounding new reproductive treatments is 137 far from universal. Although arguments in favour of more stringent regulation have been advanced (12, 138 21-24), there have also been defences of current standards (25) (26) (27) . A key argument in favour of reform 139 states that self-regulation is an unsuitable model for IVF. A free market in goods and services relies 140 upon consumers choosing not to buy useless products. If a mobile phone company were to produce a 141 new high tech phone which did not work, then after an initial flurry of interest in the new product, its 142 failings would become apparent and the market for it would disappear. Because there can be no 143 guarantee that any cycle of IVF will lead to the birth of a baby, a cycle is more likely to fail than it is to 144 work, and because patients only experience the outcome of their own situation, it is much harder for 145 consumers of infertility services to tell for themselves whether an add-on treatment is worth purchasing. 146
Rather than relying on individual patients 'voting with their feet' in order to crowd out useless 147 interventions, it may be necessary instead for an expert regulator to make recommendations for them. 148 149 150
On the other side of the fence, proponents of the status quo emphasise the point that any regulatory 151 delay might deprive patients of beneficial treatments (27). Supporters of this view generally frame the 152 potential effects of add-ons as being neutral at worst. Under this framing, the call for tighter regulation 153 is both paternalistic and perverse; patients are being "chided" by reformers for wanting to leave no stone 154 unturned (27). It is an effective argumentative device; if it were true then there would be no debate to 155 be had. It is, nonetheless, a red herring, because unfortunately some innovations do turn out to worsen 156 patient outcomes. This can be true even of well-established treatments that are routinely used (28). For 157 example, many embryos that were reported to be abnormal (mosaic) following PGT-A were discarded, 158
but we now know they can lead to normal pregnancies and they are frequently transferred. As a result, 159 it now appears that many patients who paid for earlier versions of PGT-A reduced their chance of having 160 a baby (29). sell. It can be difficult to remove an ineffective or harmful treatment from use once it has been widely 167 adopted, both due to the enthusiasm of clinicians and the preferences of patients. For example, a recent 168 large randomised controlled trial of the add-on treatment endometrial scratching suggested that the 169 painful procedure has little or no effect on live birth rates (33), but this has been greeted with claims 170 that it might work for some specific categories of infertile women (34). Intracytoplasmic sperm 171 injection for non-male factor subfertility remains common, despite a lack of randomised evidence in its 172 favour. If a trial had been mandated prior to the introduction of the techniques, the widespread provision 173 of ineffective treatments could have been prevented. 174 175 176
Consequently, it has been argued that full regulatory review should be required before the introduction 177 of a new reproductive treatment unless there are no more than minimal safety issues compared to the 178 current standard, there is no risk of reduced live birth rates, and there are no risks of societal harm (12). 179
Very few add-ons would meet all three of these conditions, particularly when potential risks to offspring 180 are considered (12) (21) (22). An ideal paradigm for the development and introduction of new 181 embryological techniques has been described, beginning with hypothesis-driven basic research and 182 moving through stages of animal testing, research on donated human embryos, and clinical trials of 183 increasing magnitude and scope, culminating in a thorough health technology assessment (21). The use of animal models is unlikely to be applicable for many interventions, due to the fact that physiological 185 differences may obfuscate effects in humans (see the example of ICSI, (21, 26) ). On the other hand, 186 with few exceptions, the clinical benefit of most interventions can and should be evaluated in a 187 randomised trial (32). Neither can these concerns be seen in isolation to other relevant aspects: the social pressures on patients 211
to have children; one's desperation to have a child of one's own (37), possible conflicts of interest 212 between commercial providers and their obligation to act in the patient's best interests (38, 39) , and the 213 vulnerabilities of patients (including their financial welfare). Ensuring that patients are supported to 214 make an informed choice that reflects their preferences and values may be especially challenging within 215 this context. Concerns around financial conflict of interest are heightened by the prospect of 216 corporatisation of reproductive care; some umbrella organisations representing several IVF clinics are 217 listed companies, so their primary interest is shareholder profit. In a clinical setting, one way to expand 218 a business is to treat to excess, which includes selling additional unnecessary treatments to patients and 219 treating people who don't need to be treated (38). Informing people that they don't need to buy your 220 product is antithetical to raising the stock price, and this is the core tension between informed patient 221 choice and direct to consumer marketing. Is more choice necessarily a good thing for patients? Some may argue providing choices aligns with 226 respecting patient autonomy. Yet autonomy's reach is limited and cannot be seen in isolation of the 227 health professional's duty not to provide treatments that are ineffective, futile, or of questionable safety 228 (40). Moreover, giving patients more choice may not always be in their best interests (41). Even where 229 a patient may pay the full cost for an add-on intervention, it may be justifiable to limit their choices 230 when the add-on's effects are unlikely to contribute to the goals of a successful pregnancy. Where there 231 is a substantive possibility that the add-on may actually reduce the patient's chance of success, the 232 principle of non-maleficence may be brought to bear (40) . The tool incorporates four domains: efficacy, safety, procedural reliability and transparency and 249 effectiveness. Treatments must pass a threshold in all four in order to achieve a higher classification. In 250 addition to the criteria for categorising infertility interventions, there is a need to identify effective 251 methods for communicating the risk and uncertainty of add-ons to prospective patients (such as the 252 EPIC fertility add-ons project: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bdAnfkKd2YGp5qd). General 253 proposals for conveying research results to lay audiences have been made (43) but have not been 254 successful in this goal (43, 44) . 255
257
It is likely that a bespoke approach to risk communication may be required for infertility treatments, 258 since the multistage nature of IVF means that success rates can be presented using a variety of 259 denominators (5). This can change both the impression of an intervention's effectiveness (the live birth 260 rate for PGT-A looks better when calculated per transfer procedure, but worse when calculated per 261 cycle started) as well as the meaning and relevance of the statistic. It is asking too much of patients to 262 parse statistical subtleties, despite suggestions from some authors that patients "must be critical of the 263 information they are exposed to" (45). Nevertheless, encouraging patients to ask the five questions recommended by the Choosing Wisely campaign, before having any test, treatment or procedure, might 265 help them make more informed decisions: 'Do I really need this test, treatment or procedure?'; 'What 266 are the risks?'; 'Are there simpler, safer options?', 'What happens if I don't do anything'; and 'What 267 are the costs' (www.choosingwisely.org.au). In the context of IVF, we might add 'how will this 268 treatment affect my chances of a live birth?' Informed consent also requires that any uncertainties, for 269 example around the size of an intervention's effect, are communicated to patients, since patients may Supposing a suitable mode of information can be identified, it remains to work out how this information 277 should be passed to patients. It would be desirable for patients to have this information brought to their 278 attention at the point of care, but the commercial setting might make impartial consultancy challenging. 279
One proposal arising from a recent executive review is the development of "compliance standards for 280 the provision of information in relation to adjuvant treatments, which includes a requirement to advise 281 patients how to access the resources developed by the regulators" (46). The report goes on to 282
recommend that these compliance standards should be included in the conditions of clinic registration. 283
But of course, this will not be the only information that patients rely upon when deciding whether to 284 pay for additional treatment services. People with infertility often report doing their own research before 285 embarking on treatment, and this generally means gathering material online, often from blogs and 286
Facebook groups, where the quality and accuracy of information may be distinctly variable (9) . 287
289
Poor information provision about research leading to excessive intervention has been included in a 290 recently proposed taxonomy of abuse in assisted reproductive technologies (47). It has become clear 291 that self-regulation cannot be relied upon to protect patients from ineffective and unnecessary treatment, 292 particularly in settings where IVF is privately funded. While industry opposition is inevitable, stronger 293 regulation appears to have broad support (48). Until that time comes, the best way to empower both 294 consumers and caregivers is to find ways to translate our knowledge about add-ons in a way that does 295 justice to any risks and uncertainties. Nonetheless, the moral imperative to reduce those risks and 296 uncertainties remains strong. 
